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GRIEVE IT AGAIN: OF STARE DECISIS, RES
JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN
LABOR ARBITRATION
71) mom's( J. HEINSZ*
INTRODUCTION
A basic notion of our legal jurisprudence is that once a court has
rendered a final judgment neither party can resurrect the decided
matters in a subsequent lawsuit.t The reasons for this precept are both
practical in nature and consistent with theories for a just resolution of
disputes. It would be a waste of resources if parties could relitigate
issues that have been decided after a hill and fItir adjudication.' The
prevailing party would have little regard for a judicial forum if the loser
could continue to assert issues that a court had already determined. 3
Further, it would be difficult for parties to enter into stable relation-
ships if they were unsure that a judicial mechanism would bring finality
to disputes that arise between them.'' As a result of these considera-
tions, courts have developed theories of stare decisis, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel to ensure that once claims and issues are adjudi-
cated the matters involved therein are conclusively resolved!'
Traditionally, parties to labor contracts have utilized arbitration
rather than litigation to settle their differences." The success of labor
* Dean and Earl E Nelson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
Member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. A.B., St. Louis University, Cornell Law
School. This article is based on a paper delivered at the 1994 inumal meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators.
1 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (Willi -RIN:NTS §§ 17-20, 27-29 (1982).
2 See, e.g., FLEMING JAsms, JR. KV AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2, at 588-89 (4th ed. 1992);
ClIARLES ALAN WRICIIT rr Al.., FEtuntm, PRAurici: AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, § 4401, at 4-5
(1982).
5 See \Vim:Err cr Al.., is 	 note 2, § 4401, at 4.
' 1 See Allan D. Vestal & Marvin Hill, Jr., Preclusion in Labor Controversies, 35 OKLA. I,. REV.
281, 296-98 (1982).
5 See, e.g., Kycnict. v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 465 (1982); Federated Dept Stores
v. Moitic, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Parklanc Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); In re Belmont. Realty Corp„ 11 E3d 1097, 1102 (1st Cir.
1998); Horowitz, v. Alloy Automotive Co., 992 F.2d 100, 105 (9th Cir. 1992); see grnerally jAm Es rr
AL., supra note 2, §§ 11.1, 11.2, 11.6; WRlGErr ET AL., supra note 2, H 4401, 4403.
I' Almost 99% or collective bargaining agreements provide ibr arbitration as the means to
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arbitration as a means of dispute resolution has been a factor in the
increasing use of arbitration in other fields.' Not surprisingly, the same
issue of finality arises in labor arbitration as it does in litigation. A
recent survey of experienced arbitrators indicated that eighty-five per-
cent of them had encountered cases where one side presented a
previous arbitration award between the same or related parties as
determinative of the issues involved.' Because parties to a collective
bargaining agreement normally have a continuing, long-term relation-
ship, it is not unusual that issues decided in prior arbitration cases later
become points of contention once more.`' Unless some form of the
principles of finality that have developed under the law of judgments
in litigation also become applicable to labor arbitration, nothing would
stop a losing party in a prior arbitration from grieving the matter
again. 19 This Article will first consider the concepts of stare clecisis, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel in the labor-arbitration context and
will review the dictates of the law as to whether a prior award on the
same issue binds a subsequent arbitrator." Next, this Article considers
what approaches arbitrators have taken when confronted with deci-
sions of prior arbitrators on the same matter. L 2 Finally, this Article
suggests an approach as to when arbitrators should defer to a prior
arbitral decision."
determine controversies over the meaning or interpretation oldie labor contract. See BUREAU OF
NATI. AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (13th ed. 1992). Typically, the company
and union select a neutral outside arbitrator. See id.
7 See Michele M. Buse, Contracting Employment Disputes Out of Thep?" System: An Analysis of
the Implementation of Binding Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the
Harsh Effects of a Non -Appealable Award. 22 PEN ,. L. REv. 1485,1488 (1995); Martin H. Malin &
Robert F. Landeson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment
Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS Li. 1187,1188 (1993); Stephen
A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title WI Claims, 58 11E00E. L. REV. 779,793 (1992).
These findings are based on a questionnaire sent by the author to 140 members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators. The survey asked (1) whether the respondent had ever ruled
on the same issue with the sane parties as another arbitrator, (2) whether the second arbitrator
considered herself or himself to he hound by the prior arbitrator's decision on the same issue
and (3) under what circumstances would the respondent feel bound by a prior award, The author
received 80 responses for a 57% return rate. The survey is on file with the author.
The National Academy of Arbitrators is a professional and honorary organization oldie most
experienced and accepted labor arbitrators in the United States. FRANK ELKOUID & EDNA ASPER
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION %Maims 20-21 (4th cd. 1985 & Stapp. 1985-89).
ELKOURI ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 20-21.
In See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17-20,27-29 (1982).
II See info notes 14-74 and accompanying text.
12 See info notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
IS See info notes 117-50 and accompanying text.
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1. THE LEGAL RULES OF THE GAME
Before stepping onto the labor-arbitration playing field, all players
must know the rules of the game. One of these rules is the extent to
which a labor arbitrator possesses the authority to reject another arbi-
ter's opinion, a concept which entails notions of stare decisis, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. 14 These legal precepts are based upon
distinct rules of law that courts have developed over centuries of liti-
gation.' 5 One might consider that there is no place in labor arbitration
for such principles because one reason that parties may choose the
arbitral forum to resolve their disputes is to avoid the use of rigid,
legalistic rules to decide cases. However, arbitrators often apply legal
doctrines based on the finality of judgments because they recognize
that the rationales embodied in them are based upon "every principle
of common sense, policy and labor relations.""'
A. Stare Decisis
Stare decisis is the application of awards "involving different par-
ties but similar issues" where the subsequent arbitrator utilizes the
reasoning found in prior cases." In legal decisions, a precedent is
binding when determined by a superior court and applied by an
inferior tribunal. The lower court is required to utilize the standard
established by the higher judicial body because it is that tribunal which
determines the applicable rule of law. Because labor arbiters are con-
sidered "courts of equal rank" with respect to each other, the decisions
by other arbitrators may be persuasive but they are not binding on a
subsequent arbitrator.'''
Some views have become so embedded in labor arbitration juris-
prudence that, although not technically binding precedents, arbitra-
tors almost universally apply these principles. For instance, placing the
burden of proof on an employer in a discharge case has become
° See. ELKouRt &ELKouiti, supra note 8, at 421 -22.
16 Spe supra note 8; See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 cum d.
116 Pan Am. Ref. Corp., 9 lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 731, 731 (1918) (McCoy, Arb.).
17 See OWEN FAIRWEATHER, FAIRWEATI IEFes PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRA-
TION 374-75 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991).
IS See Philip Harris, The Use of Precedent in Labor Arbitration, 32 Aka. J. 26, 26 (1977); Lillian
J. Howan, Comment, The Prospective Effect of Arbitration, 7 !Nous. Rm.. L.J. 60, 65 (1985); we also
Carbon J. Snow, An Arbitrator's Use of Precedent, 94 Dtck. L. Rev. 665, 670 (1990) (suggesting
greater deference to arbitral precedent). There are sonic industdes, such as coal, steel, railway
and the ptistal service, where the parties have established national and regional arbitration
boards. In these situations, by contract, companies and unions decide that, under principles of
stare decisis, the decisions of appellate review boards or umpires are binding upon regional or
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"arbitral law." 19 Yet if an arbitrator determined that in a particular
instance the union should have the burden of disproving the just cause
of a discharge, this approach, although perhaps heresy, would not
violate any binding principle of stare decisis. When the parties chose
this particular arbitrator to determine whether the employee had been
dismissed for just cause, they accepted that the arbitrator's view of the
standard would be applied in interpreting their contract, rather than
any principles of a higher tribunal. 21 Because a hierarchical structure
does not exist in arbitration, decision making occurs on a case-by-case
basis with each arbitrator bringing his or her expertise and background
to resolve the particular problem for which the parties chose the deci-
sionmaker. It is up to the individual arbitrator to determine whether
and to what extent the general principles of interpretation of labor
contracts will apply in a given case. In most cases, arbitrators will
conform to those norms that have become acceptable in labor arbitra-
tion because that is what the parties expect. Nevertheless, stare decisis
is not required in labor arbitration because the relevancy of past deci-
sions is a matter of arbitral discretion rather than binding precedent.
B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but distinct con-
cepts in the law of judgments.2 ' Unlike stare decisis, both of these
theories require not only identity of issues, but also of parties involved
in the actions. 22 Res judicata involves the notion of claim preclusion,
whereas collateral estoppel entails the idea of issue preclusion. 2' Res
judicata bars a person from relitigating a claim if (1) there is a final
judgment from prior litigation, (2) the matters raised in the sub-
sequent case either are the same or could have been litigated in the
prior action, and (3) the claims in the second action involve either the
same party or persons in privity with that party. 24 Collateral estoppel
prevents a party from relitigating an issue if (1) the issue in the
local arbitrations. See McElroy Coal Co., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 566, 567 (1989) (McIntosh,
Arb.); Erionnti & ELKOURL supra note 8, at 422-25; see also Shrewsberry Coal Co., Gen. Constr.
Crew, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 108, 109 (1991) (Volz, Arb.) (discussing res judicata doctrine in
Arbitration Review Board cases in coal industry).
19 See EILKOOR1 & ELKOUR1, supra note 8, at 661.
2O Cf. Harris, supra note 18, at 26; Snow, supra note 18, at 676-77.
21 See WRIGHT ET Al.., supra note 2, § 4402, at 6.
22 See Snow, supra note 18, at 672-76.
2:s
	 id.; WRIGHT El' Al.., supra note 2, § 4402, at 6.
24 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 & n.5 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17-20 (1982).
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subsequent litigation is the same as that raised in the prior litigation,
(2) the issue was actually litigated and necessary to a final adjudication,
(3) the person against whom the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the prior action, and
(4) the party precluded had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue. 25
A primary difference between the two doctrines is that res judicata
is based upon finality of judgments, whereas collateral estoppel gives
binding effect to the fact finding process in a prior proceeding. 26 For
res judicata to effectively preclude a claim there must be identical
parties in both causes of action, but for collateral estoppel to occur
only the person against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have
participated in the prior action. 27 Moreover, in order to apply collateral
estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue, the participant in the
second action must show that the issue was actually contested in the
first proceeding.48 In contrast, one can exercise the doctrine of res
judicata so long as the party in the prior litigation had an opportunity
to raise a claim even if the party did not actually do so. 28
An example of the distinction between the two principles can be
seen in the situation of a default judgment. 8') If a plaintiff receives a
default judgment against a defendant, in a subsequent action involving
the same matter the plaintiff could assert res judicata against every
defense that the defendant raises because the defendant's claims have
merged into the prior judgment. However, if a party not involved in
prior litigation asserted the same cause of action against the defendant
who had defaulted in the first action, the plaintiff in the second action
could not utilize collateral estoppel to bar any defenses because there
were no actual findings made in the first default judgment.
Courts have applied concepts of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel in the context of labor arbitrations. 31 In Action Distributing Co. v.
Teamsters Local 1038, an employer challenged the propriety of an
arbitrator's decision in favor of the union on the ground that the award
25 See Montana v. United States, 44() U.S. 147, 154 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs. V. University
of Ill. Found., 902 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971); Ri(sTATEmENT (SECOND) oriunGmENTs §§ 27-29.
a See Kasper Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., inc., 575 E2r1 530, 535-36 (5tli Cir.
1978); WRIGHT FA' 	 supra note 2, § 4402, at 7.
27 COMPaYeRESTATEMF,NT (SECOND) 01115DGMENTS § 17 (1082), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 29.
28 See /Casper Wire Works ., 575 F.2d at 536; WttiGirr	 Al.., supra note 2, § 4402, at 7.
29 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 4402, at 6.
36 See C. Richard Shell, /Lc judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration,
35 UCLA L. REV. (123, 657 (1088).
1 Sre, e.g., Action Distrib. Co. v. Teamsters Local 1038, 977 F.2d 1021, 1025 (6th Cir. 1092).
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was contrary to that of a prior arbitral determination on the same
matter between it and the union.'2 The employer claimed the second
determination was invalid under principles of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel." Describing the claim preclusion effect of the doctrine
of res judicata, the court determined that a prior decision "operates as
an absolute bar to any subsequent action on the same cause between
the same parties or their privies—not only with respect to every matter
that was actually litigated in the first matter, but also to every ground
of recovery that might have been presented." 34 In characterizing the
issue preclusion effect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court
stated: Wince an issue is actually and necessarily determined . .
termination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause
of action involving any party to the prior litigation."3" The court held,
however, that the claims in the two arbitration cases were sufficiently
different so that neither doctrine prevented the union from arbitrating
the issue in the second case. 3"
Courts and other authorities have determined that certain princi-
ples of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply in the field of labor
arbitration." Whether these doctrines bind arbitrators to the same
extent as they do courts of law entails notions of balancing the need
for predictability and stability in labor relations with the individual
discretion that an arbitrator must bring to bear in making a decision.
An important issue is whether the law requires arbitrators to utilize res
.2 See id. The first arbitrator had concluded that an employer that had purchased part of the
business of a predecessor wits not required to place four of its employees on a preferential hiring
list at a time when there was no need for their services. See id. Subsequently, the employer hired
employees other than the fi.tur grievants in the prior case, and the union grieved the matter again.
See id. The second arbitrator determined that once the hiring needs arose the employer should
have given preferential treatment to the four grievants. See id. The employer argued that the first
arbitrantr's decision was binding over that of the second on grounds of res judicata or collateral
estoppel. See id.
33 See id.
34 Id. at 1026.
3s Id .
3 (' The court determined that the first arbitrator ruled on whether the union had a right to
force the company to establish a preferential hiring list when it was not seeking employees, but
the second ruled on the preferential seniority rights of those who were actually hired. Action
Distrib. Co., 977 F.2d at 1026-27.
37 See, e.g., Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v. Local 1752 Auto Workers, 29 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cit 1994);
American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. WCCO Television, Inc., 934 F.2d 987, 992 (8th
Cir. 1991); Torre v. Falcon Jet Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (D,N,J, 1989); Fried v. Brevel Motors,
Inc., 666 F. Stipp. 28, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); F.I.KOURI & ELKOURI, supra Mare 8, at 414-36; FAIR-
WEATHER, supra Hole 17, at 374-87; MARVIN F. HILL & ANTHONY V. SINICROVI, EVIDENCE IN
Aintrratatorq 390-409 (2d ed. 1987); Jay E. Grenig, Stare Deeisis, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in Labor Arbitration, 38 LAB. L.J. 195, 203 (1987); Malin & Lancleson, supra note 7. at
1190; Vestal & Hill, .supra note 4, at 296-98; Howan, supra note 18, at 65.
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judicata and collateral estoppel when there has been a prior arbi-
tral award on the same matter involving one or both of the same
parties."
C. Legal Structures
In considering what limits, if any, courts place on an arbitrator's
authority to reject a prior award involving the same issue between the
same parties, the guiding star is W R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, United
Rubber Workers." In this case, a second arbitrator found that the first
arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement con-
cerning seniority provisions was not binding.'" In the subsequent ap-
peal, the Supreme Court focused only on the enforceability of the
second award, without commenting on the validity of the first, and
decided that the scope of the second arbitrator's authority to deter-
mine that he was not bound by the prior decision was itself a matter
of contract interpretation:" The Court concluded that the second
arbitrator's decision, holding that the first, award was without prece-
dential force, drew its "essence" from the provisions of the contract
and thus met the review standard developed in United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. some years earlier. 42 Although some have
questioned the extent of the W. R. Grace holding, it suggests that res
judicata in labor arbitration is not a binding legal principle but, a
matter of contract interpretation.°
3m See infra notes 39-74 and accompanying text.
"See generally 451 U.S. 757 (1983).
44) 1d. at 751.
'11 See id. at 765.
42 Id. at 766. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,595-97,599
(1960), the Supreme Court noted that:
refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. ... [A] n arbitra-
tor is con lined to interpretation and itpplication of the collective bargaining agree-
ment; lie does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. may of
course look Itir guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long
as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.... [T] he question
of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the aifii-
trator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained For; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overriding him because their interpretation of the contract is different
from his.
Id.; see also United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,36-38 (1987).
43 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 425-26 11.46; & SINICROPI, SUM note 37,
at 398; Thomas C.S. Christensen, W.R. Grace and Co.: An Epilogue to the Trilogy?, 37 NAT'L. AGAD.
Axis. 21-32 (1985).
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Subsequent lower court cases have leaned in this direction. 41 For
example, in Production & Maintenance Employees' Local 504 v. Road-
master Corp., the union had lost an arbitration in which it had claimed
that the employer must continue to bargain with it and apply a labor
contract despite the employer's hiring of a majority of permanent
replacements during a strike: 15
 Undeterred by its initial arbitral set-
back, the union filed a second grievance alleging the same claim but
based on a different theory. 4° The company refused to arbitrate on the
ground that the claim was precluded by res judicata.47
 The Seventh
Circuit, citing W R. Grace, found no preclusion and affirmed the
district court judge's order to arbitrate:'' The court held:
Whether more than one arbitrator can take a crack at inter-
preting the contract is itself a question of contractual inter-
pretation. . . . Arbitrators frequently interpret the scope and
binding effect of earlier arbitral decisions. Parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement may elect to have rigorous rules of
preclusion or lax ones. Courts enforce rules of merger and
bar, precluding a second litigation to consider claims that
could have been, but were not, resolved in the first. Contract-
ing parties and their arbitrators do not always select such
strict rules.''"
This deference to the second arbitrator's determination of the
binding effect of a prior award was followed in Hotel Ass'n of Washing-
ton, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25, but with
44 See, e.g., United Indus. Workers v. Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 1993); Hotel
Ass'n of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union. Local 25, 963 F.2d 388,
393 (D.C. Cir. 1902); Production & Maintenance Employees' Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 916
F.2d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 1990); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers. 718 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1983); Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union
No. 11, 702 E2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1983); Bacardi Corp. v. Ct' Ingres° de Uniones Industriales de
Puerto Rico, 692 F.2(1 210, 212 (1st Cir. 1982); Westinghouse Elevators of P.R., Inc. v. S.1.U. de
Puerto Rico, 583 E.2(1 1184, 1187 (1st Cir. 1978); International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 616
v. Byrd Plastics, 428 F.2d 23, 27 (3d Cir. 1970); Teamsters Local 623 v. Unshed Parcel Serv., Inc.,
785 F. Stapp. 509, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Glass & Allied Workers Intl Union v. Deena Prod. Co.,
638 F. Stipp. 34, 30 (W.D. Ky. 1086); Wagner Div., McGraw Edison Co. v. Local 1104. International
Union of Elec. Workers, 583 F. Stipp. 239, 244 (E.1). Mo. 1984), iev'd, 767 F.2d 485 (8th Cir.
1985); Teamsters Local 786 v. Glenview Material Co., 56'2 N.E.2d 289, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
45 916 E2d at 1162.
46 In the first grievance, the union argued that the arbitrator had made his decision solely
on the basis of the National labor Relations Act, but in its second grievance, the union based its




 Id.; see also Westinghouse Elevators, 583 F.2d at 1184.
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a twist.'" There, the subsequent arbitrator disagreed with a prior arbi-
trator's award interpreting a premium pay clause even though the two
were members of a permanent panel of arbitrators chosen by the
parties to resolve matters of contract interpretation.'' Again, the appel-
late court applied W R. Grace for the proposition that it was the second
arbitrator's call to determine the binding effect of the prior arbiter's
award." The employer argued that the first arbitration by contract was
"final and binding" and thus bound subsequent arbitrators." The court
rejected the argument, noting that both arbitrators' opinions were
plausible interpretations but that the court was reviewing only the
second." In such a circumstance, the court would enforce the second,
inconsistent award because "the [collective bargaining agreement] as
a whole requires [the second arbitrator] only to consider, not neces-
sarily to follow, a prior award in making his own decision."'" According
to Hold Ass'n of Washington, the second arbitrator is not totally a free
agent because that person must give some consideration to prior in-
terpretations." The court intimated that if the latter arbitrator had
totally ignored the first award on the same issue, then a different result
may have occurred.''
Such a limit was placed on the discretion of an arbitrator who
entirely disregarded a prior award between the parties in Trailways
Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. joint Council. 58
 There, a second arbitrator,
contrary to the decision of a previous arbitrator, had struck down an
employer's "no beard" grooming rule.• The appellate court concluded
that the second arbiter's award did not draw its essence from the
51 '963 F.2d at 392.
51 1n 1986, the first arbitrator had determined Ow it hotel need not pay a part-time employee
"premium pay." See id. ;IA 394. In 1988, the second arbitrator, under the same contract with the
same parties, but a different hotel in the multi-employer association, 'build that the hotel was
required to pay part-time employees such premium pay. See id. The second arbitrator rejected
the company's chains of res judicata and collateral estoppel, stating that "no Arbitrator sir mid
issue a decision that. is contrary to his own judgment on the law or his own sense of justice." Id.
at 389.
52 Id. at 389.
5I See id. at 390; we infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text regarding "incorporation
theory."
5.1
 Hotel ASS'll of Washington, 963 F.2d at 390.
55 Id.
51 ' See also Wilbur Chocolate Co. v. Bakery Workers Union Local 464, No. GIV.A.84i-5479,
19148 WL 33881, at *5 (El/ Pa. Mar. 31, 1988) (second arbitrator's decision improper because
he failed to give appropriate consideration to prior arlsitral award regarding same issue between
same parties), alp, 862 F.2(1 312 (3d Cir. 1988).
57 See Hotel Ass'n of Washington, 963 F.2d at 390.
58 807 F.2d 1416, 1419 (8th Cir. 1986).
59 See id. at 1419.
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contract because it ignored what the court considered relevant con-
tract provisions and the "law of the shop." 6" The court determined that,
when the first arbitrator definitively construed a provision of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, "such construction becomes part of the
existing labor agreement."61 The court held:
Although an arbitrator generally has the power to determine
whether a prior award is to be given preclusive effect, .
courts have also recognized that the doctrine of res judicata
may apply to arbitrations with strict factual identities. . . . If
an arbitrator does not accord any precedential effect to a
prior award in a case like this, or at least explain the reasons
for refusing to do so, it is questionable when, if ever, a "final
and binding" determination will evolve from the arbitration
process."2
In Trailways Lines, the court gave substantial deference to the idea
that the first award had contractual effect. 63 Thus, in addition to
considering the first arbitrator's interpretation, as cautioned by the
court in Hotel Ass 'n of Washington, Trailways Lines indicates that the
second arbitrator should explain its inapplicability where a contract
makes arbitration decisions "final and binding" on the parties.TM
Another danger of inconsistent awards was exemplified by Con-
necticut Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers. 65 Two arbitrators in a span of months gave contrary
interpretations to a manning clause!'" The first arbitrator required the
company always to have a work crew of at least three persons; the
second held that this was not necessary. 67 The court determined that
"both „ . awards would survive judicial scrutiny under the Enterprise
Wheel test."" However, the court concluded that in such circumstances
Id. at 1422.
61 Id. at 1419.
62 Id. at 1424-25. It is interesting to note that the second arbitrator did refer to the award
granted by the first arbitintor, but concluded that the prior decision represented the "Minor-
ity view" and did not resolve the contractual issue presented to the second arbitrator. See id.
The second arbitrator also noted "[t]he principles of stare decisis and res judicata do not have
the saute doctrinal force in arbitration proceedings as they do in judicial proceedings." Id. at
1419 ti.7.
63 See 807 F.2d at 1424-25.
61 See id. at 1425.
65 718 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1983).
66 See id. at 18.
67 See id.
Id. at 21.
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it was up to the court itself to "select that interpretation which most
nearly conforms to the intent of the parties.' 19 The court then resolved
the conflict by acceding to the second award, which it concluded was
the better reasoned approach and more closely reflected the intent of
the parties!" Although the court's decision brought finality to the
dispute, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the result was at the
cost of the court deciding the merits when it chose the "correct"
award!'
Despite Connecticut Light & Power, under the "essence" standard
of review, courts generally should confirm even conflicting awards. 72
The "legal rules of the game" as established by the Supreme Court in
W R. Grace allow subsequent arbitrators considerable latitude to dis-
regard the awards of prior arbiters. As long as the differing awards have
a basis in the contract, each passes Enterprise Wheel muster and should
be confirmed by a reviewing court. This approach makes much sense
in the context of labor arbitration. Otherwise, in determining whether
res judicata or collateral estoppel apply in a given situation, courts
would be drawn into a morass of decision making on substantive issues
which the parties have committed to labor arbitration. For instance,
courts would have to determine whether the second arbitration in-
volves the same or related parties and, likewise, whether the issues were
sufficiently identical or could have been raised in the first arbitral
proceeding. Other issues, such as changed circumstances between the
time of the first arbitral award and the second, would be relevant. All
of this could require elaborate fact finding which the Supreme Court
has determined courts should avoid in the labor arbitration context
because the parties by contract have committed such issues to the
arbitrator!"
Placing the determination of the applicability of prior awards in
the hands of arbitrators may result in conflicting awards. Although it
is an understandable temptation for a court, as in Trailways Lines or
Connecticut Light & Power, to step in and make a final determination
when the second arbitrator creates a conflict of decisions on the same
issue between the same parties with little explanation or justification,
this approach should be avoided. Otherwise courts, rather than arbi-
trators, will end up interpreting labor agreements contrary to the terms
69 Id.
7" COntiertiail Light Ce Power, 807 F.2(1 al 21.
71 See id.
72 See supra note 42.
So? Alicen. 484 U.S. al 44-45; Buffalo Forge Co. v, United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,410-13
(1976).
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of the arbitration clause and the congressional policy favoring arbitra-
tion:7' If inconsistent awards cause significant problems for the parties,
resolution is available at the negotiating table or once again through
the grievance-arbitration machinery.
Nevertheless, cases like Trailways Lines and Connecticut Light &
Power should be warning signs that arbitrators should tread carefully
when declaring that a prior opinion involving the same parties and the
same issue is unsound and will not be given res-judicata or collateral-
estoppel effect. Due care in explaining both the rightness of a position
and the wrongness of the prior award is advisable to ensure surviving
strict Enterprise Wheel scrutiny by a reviewing court.
II. ARBITRAL APPROACHES
The weight of legal authority has placed the deference accorded
to a prior award primarily in the hands of arbitrators. 75 Because the
issue of determining the binding effect of a prior award between the
same parties on the same issue is a common one, many arbitrators have
considered the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel to
labor arbitration. 7" Not surprisingly, they hold a wide spectrum of views
on the binding effect of prior awards involving the same issues and
one or more of the same parties." These opinions generally fall within
one of three broad categories that may be described as ( 1 ) the con-
tractual approach, (2) the incorporation theory, and (3) the inde-
pendent judgment principle.
A. Contractual Approach
As in most arbitral situations, the first rule is to follow the intent
of the parties. 78 Some agreements specifically state that prior decisions
are binding; others state just the opposite. 7" For instance, in the coal
74 See 29 U.S.0 § 171(b) (1994); United Steelworkers V. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
N See supra notes 14-74 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 8.
77 See EL.xoukl & EI.KOURI, supra note 8, at 414-19.
78 See id. at 348 ("The rule primarily to be observed in the construction of written agreements
is that the interpreter must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the mutual intent of the
parties."); FAutwEivritER, supra note 17, at 172 ("An arbitrator's principal Iiinction is to interpret
the collective bargaining agreement"); Jay E. Crenig, Principles of Contract Interpretation, in 1 Tim
13.oRNsTEIN & ANN GOSLINE, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 14.10[2] (1995) ('The
primary goal of contract interpretation is to determine the mutual intent of the parties.").
79 See, e.g., Teledyne Ryan Aeronautics, 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1072, 1074 (1990) (Weiss,
Arb.) (parties agree that prior arbitration will hind them on subsequent issue).
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industry, parties to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
have a special provision regarding the precedential impact of arbitra-
tion awards!" In this sector, the parties at one time had established a
national arbitration board with appellate review over certain decisions
made by local arbitrators.81 The appellate board had powers by contract
that embodied notions of stare decisis and res judicata." Although the
parties eliminated the review board, some of its decisions still have
binding effect." Decisions by the review board which fall under the
applicable provisions of the labor agreement must be followed by other
arbitrators." It would be beyond an arbitrator's authority to refuse to
give preclusive effect to an earlier award where the company and union
have determined that the award should have an effect.85
The contrary situation exists in some labor contracts. In certain in-
dustries companies and unions have established expedited arbitration
procedures!'" Parties often establish an accelerated grievance mecha-
nism due to a backlog of cases which causes them to conclude that the
grievance process can be streamlined. For instance, in applicable cases
in the steel industry, management and union officials modified their
normal arbitration requirements for hearings, transcripts, and briefs
""Article XIII, section k of the contract provides: "[A]11 decisions of the Arbitration Review
Board rendered prior to the expiration of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1978 shall continue to have precedential effect under this Agreement to the extent that the basis
for such decisions have not been modified by subsequent changes in this agreement." For
decisions involving the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1978, see island Creek
Coal Co., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1075 (1995) (Suntrup, Arb.); Amax Coal Co., 104 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 790 (1995) (Stoltenberg, Ark); Drummond Co., 97 Lab. Arb, Rep. (BNA) 983 (1991)
(Kilroy, Arb.); Freeman Coal Co., 87 Lab, Arb. Rep. (BNA) 665 (1986) (Clarke, Arh.); Consoli-
dation Coal Co., 82 Lab. Arh. Rep. (BNA) 889 (1984) (Abrams, Arb.).
81 See supra note 18.
82 See supra note 18.
ss See ELKOUR1 & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 118.
84 One such principle concerned the doctrine or res judicata. in Arbitration Review Board
Decision 78-24, the tribunal concluded that an arbitration decision binds a subsequent arbitrator
when the grievance arises between the same parties, at the same operation, on the same fact
situation, and involving the same issues of contract interpretation and application as presented
in a former grievance decided by a prior award. Because Arbitration Review Board Decision 78
-24
was rendered prior to the expiration of the 1978 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and
has not been subsequently changed in the contract, it continues to have precedential effect. See
Island Creek Coal Cu., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 710, 712 (1995) (Jones, Arb.); Arch of III., 105
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 445, 446 (1995) (Feldman, Ark); Old Ben Coal Co., 102 Lab. Arh. Rep.
(BNA) 823, 827 (1994) (Feldman, Arb.); Arch of West Virginia, 90 Lab. Arh. Rep. (BNA) 1220,
1222 (1988) (Vole, Arb.); Monterey Coal Co., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 989, 991 (1987) (Fullmer,
Arh.); Freeman United Coal Mine Co., 84 Lab, Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1302, 1303 (1985) (Feldman,
Arts.).
85 See supra rime 80.
86
 See, e.g., attouRi & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 293-95 (discussing steel industry).
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so that particular grievances could be resolved more quickly and effi-
ciently, but at the same time in a fair and just manner. 87 Because this
expedited process does not involve the full decision making procedure
of a normal arbitration, the parties have determined that the decisions
are not binding precedent. 88
 In the final analysis it is the parties'
decision whether they want an arbitrator to give res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel effect to prior decisions. The arbitrator is the "creature
of the parties" and must defer to their determination. 8" For an arbiter
to refuse to follow contractual dictates concerning the binding nature
of previous awards would cause the decision to be void because it would
not be based on the "essence" of the contract as required by Enterprise
Wheel!'"
B. Incorporation Theory
Although any arbitrator must adhere to contracts which specifi-
cally require that prior awards be given precedential effect, few labor
agreements have such clauses."' As a result, most arbitrators have dis-
cretion to determine whether awards between the same parties should
preclude subsequent grievances over the same or related matters. 92
Many arbitrators utilize what may be referred to as the "incorporation
theory" to give binding effect to prior decisions that meet the criteria
established by the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel."
Under this approach, the typical contractual clause making an arbitral
decision "final and binding" not only settles the dispute between the
parties but also causes the award to become part of their contract. 34
This is especially true where subsequent negotiations have not changed
the outcome of the award. There each party had an opportunity to
87
 For a description of the expedited arbitration procedure in the steel industry, see aRouRI
ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 293-95; MAuRtcE S. TROTTA, AR13ITRATION or LAlioR-MANAGEMENT
Dispiyms 221-22 (1974).
8g See Ben Fischer, The Steelworkers Union and the Steel Companies, 32 NAT'L ACAD. ARR. 198
(1980).
89 See John E. Dunsford, Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 Si'. Louis U. L.J. 109,
112 (1985),
'") See supra note 42.
A 1971 study of a sample of 400 collective bargaining agreements indicated that only three
percent of the contracts addressed the precedent-setting aspects of arbitration awards. See BUREAU
OF NAT'L. AFFAIRS, BASIC PATFERNs IN UNION CoNTRAcTs 1:1, 51:8 (7th ed. t971). Of those few
that did, all but two provided that an award would not be considered precedent. See id.
92 See supra notes 39-74 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1011, 1013 (1958)
(Valtin, Arh.); see also FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 380-81.
9.1 See BUREAU or NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PNITERNs IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (13th ed. 1992).
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alter the effect of an arbitral decision through bargaining, but chose
not to do so. 95 Accordingly, a later arbitrator faced with the same issues
between the same parties is as bound by the first decision as by the
language of the parties' agreement."
An example of the incorporation theory is Arbitrator Dennis No-
lan's decision in Stone Container Corp.97 There, a prior arbitrator had
granted to affected employees monetary relief from the employer for -
improper overtime bypasses.`'" Arbitrator Nolan determined that the
company had not litigated the remedy issue before the first arbitrator
and that "[Gull litigation might well have convinced [the first arbitra-
tor], as it did me, that there was no implied agreement to compensate
victims of overtime bypasses with money."`'`' In other words, had this
been a case of first itnpression, Nolan indicated he would have con-
cluded that there was no binding practice requiring a monetary rem-
edy, as opposed to an opportunity to make up missed overtime work."'
Nevertheless, Nolan concluded that the company had an opportunity
to arbitrate the issue of remedy and that the first award of monetary
relief was controlling:
As a matter of arbitral jurisprudence, an arbitrator's interpre-
tation of an agreement binds later arbitrators in similar cases.
In effect, the award amends the Agreement until the parties
jointly change the arbitrator's interpretation. The Company
and the Union have said as much in Article V of the Agree-
ment, which makes an arbitrator's award "final and binding
upon all matters as to which he shall have authority." 1 "I
Arbitrator Hartwell Hooper in Monarch Tile, Inc. gave further
rationale for the incorporation theory:
If this arbitrator were to ignore the earlier decision and issue
a contrary decision merely because he preferred a different
interpretation, the parties would be right back where they
were when the dispute first arose. They would have gone
95 See Grenig, supra note 37, at 202 (losing party's failure to cause change in contract
language in later collective agreement acts as form of estoppel to prohibit another grievance
issue).
96 See id.
Sea generally 96 Lab. Arb, Rep. (RNA) 483 (1990) (Nolan, Arh,). Sec also United Tel.-S.E.,
101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 316 (1993) (Nolan, Arb.).
98 See Slane Container, 96 Lab, Arb. Rep, (BNA) at 484.
99 Id, at 488.
u" See id. at 986.
1"1./d.
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through the trouble and expense of two arbitration cases
without having their dispute resolved. If the Company were
to prevail this time, the parties would be deadlocked at a score
of I to 1. Under these conditions, no one should be surprised
if the Union wanted another turn at bat. Like an extra-innings
baseball game, the dispute could potentially go on indefi-
nitely and never be resolved if each subsequent arbitrator felt
free to go his own way with the issue. That would defeat the
purpose of the arbitration clause and deprive the parties of
any degree of confidence in what the contract means. They
would not be well served by that. 162
However, even under the incorporation theory, there are generally
accepted exceptions allowing a later arbitrator to disregard a prior
award. For instance, if there is not an identity of parties or issues in
the first and second awards, the previous decision should not be
binding because either it is not a component of these parties'
agreement or it is a matter that has not been decided.'''' Other
exceptions to the incorporation theory were aptly noted by Arbitra-
tor Jack Clarke in North American Rayon Corp.:
The situations where an arbitrator has commonly declined to
follow a prior arbitration decision between the same parties
at the same facility and involving the same issue are those
wherein (1) the prior decision was an instance of bad judg-
ment, (2) conditions existing at the time of the prior decision
and of the grievance being arbitrated are significantly differ-
ent, (3) there was not a full and fair hearing at the time of
the earlier decision and (4) the prior decision was made
without the benefit of some important facts or considera-
tions. 1 ° 4
These exceptions provide opportunity for a second arbitrator to
distinguish the decision of the first in appropriate circumstances. For
1 °2 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (RNA) 585, 587 (1993); see also International Ass'n of Fire Fighters,
86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1201 (1986) (Alleyne, Arb.).
103 See, e.g., International Chem. Workers Union Local No. 189 v. Purer: Corp., 427 F. Su pp.
338, 342 (0. Neb. 1977) (different issues); Teamsters Local No. 25 v. Penn Transit. Corp., 359 F.
Stipp. 344, 349 (1). Mass. 1973) (same); Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 98 Lab. AO). Rep. (BNA) 105, 107
(1992) (Baroni, Arb.) (same); City of Oak Creek, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (RNA) 710, 712 (1988)
(Baron, Arb.) (different parties).
1 °4 95 Lab. Arb, Rep. (BNA) 748, 751 (1990); see also Monarch Tile, Inc., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 585, 587 (1993) (Hooper, Arb.); EI,ROURI & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 428-30; lltt.t. &
SINICROPI, .supra note 37, at 399-400.
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instance, because labor agreements are continuous in nature, it is not
unusual that the effect of an arbitration decision can last for years upon
their relationship. Yet, if the situation substantially changes because of
new circumstances or technology, then the basis for the prior arbitral
decision may no longer exist.'" 5 Likewise, it would offend basic notions
of due process to obligate a party to follow a decision when the person
was unfairly deprived of an opportunity to contest a matter in a prior
case. On the other hand, these exceptions should not be allowed to
undermine the incorporation theory. Any losing party will argue that
the prior decision was "bad judgment" or will assert some factual
difference in the present case. However, when the parties and the
issues are fundamentally the same, most arbitrators who follow the
incorporation theory place a heavy burden of persuasion on the party
seeking to reverse a prior decision.'"" By giving deference to prior
arbitral awards as an integral part of the collective agreement, arbitra-
tors adhering to the incorporation theory uphold the rationale of res
judicata and collateral estoppel in the labor-arbitration context.
C. Independent Judgment Principle
At the other end of the doctrinal spectrum are arbitrators who
emphasize the independent judgment which parties want an arbitrator
to bring to a proceeding—even to issues heard a second or third
time. 107
 This is a narrower approach to the effect of the arbitral deci-
sion making process than that used by those who adhere to the incor-
poration theory. Because there is no appellate system resulting in
binding precedent in labor arbitration, those who follow this principle
believe that companies and unions want an arbitrator to resolve a given
dispute unfettered by the opinions of other arbitrators. 108 For instance,
Arbitrator Millard Cass in Hotel Ass'n of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 disregarded another arbitra-
tor's award on the same contractual issue between the parties and con-
cluded that this was appropriate when the prior decision was "contrary
to his own judgment on the law or his sense of justice." Underlying
this theory is the notion that arbitration is meant to solve only the
105
 See also Monarch Tile, 101 Lab. Ark Rep. (LINA) at 587 (prior award by arbitrator that
forbade employer from banning smoking in lunch 1 .00111 and designated areas no longer binding
because of scientific evidence introduced at second hearing concerning effects of second-hand
smoke).
"I See id. (party seeking to reverse prior decision has heavy burden of persuasion).
107 Gf ELKOURI & ELKOURI, .5iltkra note 8, at 410-17.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
Mg 963 F.2d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, United Rubber
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particular issue that the parties submit to an arbitrator without binding
them to a given course of conduct as a result of prior decisions."°
This position was well stated by Arbitrator Robert Williams in a
case where he gave no effect to the awards of two prior arbitrators on
an issue involving assignment of overtime, because he concluded that
they had incorrectly interpreted the agreement:
The reasoning of prior awards should be followed if they
were correctly decided. If previous awards incorrectly inter-
pret an agreement they should be disregarded as errone-
ous. . . In [North American Rayon Corp.] Arbitrator Clarke
contended arbitrators follow prior awards even in cases in
which the later arbitrator would have reached a different
result. Supposedly, this norm promotes stability in the collec-
tive bargaining relationship. I dare say, erroneous awards
promote instability, not stability."'
This "independent judgment" approach allows each succeeding
arbitrator to determine de novo the correctness of the prior award
in interpreting the contract."' Arbitrator Williams invited the par-
ties to "relitigate the same issue in a later incident until their agree-
ment is correctly interpreted and applied."" 3 As to his own award,
he believed:
[I]f a party does not understand the reasoning and result in
this case to correctly interpret and apply the Agreement, they
are free to grieve a later similar incident and seek another
arbitrator's opinion. The next arbitrator can review the opin-
ions of three (3) prior arbitrators and decide his case. At least
in theory, the parties and arbitrators eventually will recognize
correct reasoning and results.'"
The independent judgment principle gives little deference to
prior decisions between the parties even as to similar issues.''5 This
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 761 (1983); Westinghouse Elemtors of P.R., Inc. v. S.1.U. de P.R., 583 F.2d
1184, 1188 (1st Cir. 1078).
II° See ELKOLOU & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 416-17.
"I Hercules, hie., Am. Aril.' Ass'n Case No. 31-300-00129-91, at 25-26 (July 17, 1992)
(Williams, Arb.) (unpublished opinion on file with author). For North American Rayon Corp., see
95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (RNA) 748, 750 (1990) (Clarke, Arb.); see supra note 104 and accompany-
Mg text.
112 See Hercuks, Inc., Am, Arb. Ass'n Case No. 31-300-00120-91, at 25-26).
113 1d.
114 1d. at 26-27.
" 5 See id.
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method avoids the application of legalistic rules such as res judicata or
collateral estoppel." 6
 In addition, it likely shifts the process of dispute
resolution from arbitration to negotiation by causing the parties to
settle their own differences so as to avoid the problem of inconsistent
awards.
III. A RECOMMENDED POLICY OF DEFERENCE
A. Principle of Constraint
A study of arbitral cases and authority indicates that most arbitra-
tors are closer to the incorporation theory than to the independent
judgment principle." 7
 Those adherents to the incorporation theory
believe that the parties' relationship is based on more than just the
words in their collective bargaining agreement or the actions and
practices developed over time. Often when the parties cannot agree
on the terms of their contract or the course of action that they should
follow, they turn to the arbitration process to define their association.
Under the incorporation theory, the resultant awards become a part
of that relationship which should be changed only by the parties
through negotiation, but not by later arbitrators unless convincing
reasons exist. This approach gives more emphasis to the arbitration
process and its finality than does the independent judgment postulate.
A recent questionnaire to members of the National Academy of
Arbitrators also indicated support for the incorporation method of
adhering to prior awards." 8
 The responses typically stated that the first
arbitration decision should be followed "unless completely off the wall"
or "clearly erroneous" or "palpably wrong" or "it should he thrown in
116 See Social Sec. Admin., 91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 927, 930 (1988) (Kaplan, Ati) (rcs
judicata applies to judicial proceedings and nut to labor arbitration),
117
 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, ,supra note 8, at 426-28; FAIR WEAT I Wit, supra note 17, at 380-81;
Monarch Tile, Inc., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 585, 588 (1993) (Hooper, Arb.); United Tel.-S.E.,
101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 316, 317 (1993) (Nolan, Arb.); Southeastern Pa. Transp. Audi., 100
Lab. Arb. Rep. (DNA) 767, 769 (1992) (Guulet, Arb.); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 98 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1196, 1198 (1992) (normal', Arb.); General Servs. Admin., 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (13NA)
641, 643 (1991) (Hockenberry, Arb.); Stone Container Corp., 06 Lab. Arb, Rep. (BNA) 483, 485
(1990) (Nolan, Arb.); Armco, Inc., 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (11NA) 34, 36 (1090) (Strongin, Arb.); Lucky
Stores, Inc., 88-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCM 1 8316 (1988) (Jones, Arb.); International Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1201, 1204 (1986) (Alleyne, Arb.); Todd Shipyards Corp.,
69 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 27, 29 (1977) (lanes, Arb.); Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co., 68 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 421, 424 (1976) (Simon, Arb.); Howard Papermills, 67 Lab, Arb. Rep. (BNA)
863, 867 (1986) (Dworkin, Arb.); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1011,
1013 (1958) (Valtin, Arb.),
""See supra note 8.
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the wastebasket.""`' One arbitrator noted that "although [the arbitra-
tion system involved] no hierarchy, [following a prior decision on the
same issue between the same parties] avoids confusion and arbitrator
shopping." 12°Another response insightfully pointed out that the parties
could "overrule had decisions in negotiations." 12 '
Nevertheless, it would be erroneous for labor arbitrators to re-
quire complete adherence to a res judicata/collateral estoppel ap-
proach in all cases. Some cases by their nature lack the identity of
issues necessary for a prior award to be binding. The outcome of such
cases usually are fact-dependent and often require that the arbitrator
weigh various individual criteria.' 22
 Typical examples would be disci-
pline and discharge cases. Often management establishes a rule and
takes disciplinary action against an employee who violates it.' 23 For
instance, an employer may promulgate an absenteeism policy which
provides given levels of discipline for employees who are absent with-
out good cause. 124 If an employee is disciplined for violating this policy,
the union might challenge both the reasonableness of the absentee-
ism rule and whether the worker should have been disciplined under
it. If an arbitrator upheld both the rule and the discipline of the
particular employee who had violated it, this decision would not, in all
respects, bind a subsequent arbitrator faced with a grievance from a
different employee disciplined under the same policy. The second
arbitrator should follow the first award on the appropriateness of the
company's absenteeism policy for the reasons discussed under the
incorporation theory. 125 However, the application of the rule to the
second employee depends upon the individual situation. 126 Whether
112 See supra note 8.
1211
	 supra note 8.
121 See supra note 8.
122 See Vestal & Hill, supra note 4, at 360-62.
125 See generally Motor Prod.-Owosso Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 215 (1996) (Borland,
Arb.) (discipline for violating rule prohibiting drinking alcohol on company premises and be-
coming under the influence); Monsanto Co., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (RNA) 923 (1996) (O'Grady,
Arb.) (discharge of employee for violating company rule against theft); Store Kraft Mfg., 100 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 666 (1993) (Bailey, Arb.) (discipline for violating company rules against engag-
ing in non-essential conversations and entering plant without permission while off duty); Indian-
apolis Pub. Transp. Corp., 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 557 (1991) (Doering, Arb.) (summary
discharge for violating company rule prohibiting carrying weapon on company property).
124 see, e.g., Dixon Ticonderoga Co., 100 Lab. Arh. Rep. (BNA) 1222, 1224 (1993) (Feldman,
Arb.); Multiplex Co., 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1203, 1205 (1992) (Hilgert, Arb.); Potlatch Corp.,
96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (RNA) 1074, 1077 (1991) (Goldstein, Arb.); Cooper Indus., 94 Lab. Ark Rep.
(BNA) 830, 832 (1990) (Yarowsky, Arb.); General Foods Corp., 91 Lab. Arh. Rep. (BNA) 1251,
1254 (1988) (Goldstein, Arb.).
125 See supra text accompanying notes 91-106.
126 See Arch of III., 82 Lab. Ark Rep. (BNA) 625, 628 (1984) (Hewitt, Ark) (prior award that
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that employee breached the rule and, if so, the amount of appropriate
discipline would be issues that the second arbitrator must determine
based upon weighing many factors in the particular circumstances of
the case rather than applying res judicata principles from the prior
award. t!7
Another caution in applying res judicata or collateral estoppel in
labor arbitration is the identity of the parties to the action. Both the
collective agreement and arbitration cases decided thereunder are
between management and union. The union, however, operates in a
representative capacity on behalf of employees in the bargaining unit.
In most instances when the union arbitrates an issue, it will act as the
duly authorized agent capable of binding employees. 128 However, this
might not always be the case where the parties' interests may diverge.' 29
An issue as to the identity of parties may also arise in situations involv-
ing multiple parties, such as members of a multi-employer association,
an employer with more than one bargaining unit or a pension dispute
affecting employer, union and trustees.'" In all of these instances an
arbitrator must give careful consideration to the relationship of all
determined employee's failure to report without good cause would be unexcused absence estab-
lishes reasonableness of rule but is not res judicata as to its application); see also Arch of W. Va.,
90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1220, 1222 (1988) (Volt, Arb.); Monterey Coal Co., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 989, 993 (1987) (Fullmer, Arb.).
127 A similar situation exists in cases where the issues concern not so much the meaning of
the contract or the parties' rights under it, but an application of the agreement to particular
circumstances. See, e.g., Consolidated Coal Co., GR. No. 94-47A, 1995 WL 594606 (Ian. 4, 1995)
(Fullmer, Arb.) (res judicata has limited utility in cases involving whether past practice or custom
has changed over time); York Daily Record, Inc„ 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 337, 342 (1992)
(Valentine, Arb.) (prior award not controlling on issue of value to he given employee's prior work
experience in determining starting wage level).
12N See, e.g., Schweizer Aircraft Corp. v. Local 1751 Autoworkers Union, 29 F.3d 83, 89 (2d
Cir. 1994) (res judicata will apply to union arbitrating grievance on behalf of retired employees).
t" Where statutes provide employees with individual rights, arbitration cases brought by
unions do not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effects on later judicial proceedings by
employees because of differing interests between the two parties. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of
W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728,
734 (1980); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 43 (1974).
lgG See Hotel Ass'n of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25,
963 F,2d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (prior award in favor of employer in multi-employer association
does not bind arbitrator in decision on same issue between same union and different employer
member of association); American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. WCCO Television, Inc.,
934 F.2d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 1991) (pension trustees not bound by arbitration award adverse to
union as to employer's benefit contributions); Fairview Southdale Hosp., 96 Lab. Arb, Rep. (BNA)
1129, 1133 (1991) (Flagler, Arb.) (arbitrator not bound by prior award involving same employer
but with different union). But see Fried V. Breve] Motors, Inc., 666 F. Stipp. 28, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(res judicata precludes pension trustees from recovering employer contributions after union loses
arbitration award on same issue because of commonality of interest between trustees and union);
Lucky Stores, Inc., 88-2 Lab. Arb, Awards (CCH) 8316.
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connected to the dispute before concluding that a prior award is
binding. 13 '
Before applying the incorporation theory to bar a party from
re-arbitrating a matter, an arbitrator should also consider the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes. 132
These ethical canons not only require "impartiality" but also that the
arbitrator assume "full personal responsibility for the decision in each
case decided."'" This approach requires the second arbitrator not to
elevate consistency above reason so as to perpetuate erroneous inter-
pretations.'" In many instances, a fair award depends upon a flexible
approach in determining the binding effect of a prior award as applied
to the individual factors of a subsequent case. For these reasons an
arbitrator should not rely on too legalistic an application of stare
decisis, res judicata or collateral estoppel.
On the other hand, the essence of a contract is to allow parties
to plan for and control the future of their relationship to the fullest
extent possible. Consistency in decision making on the same issues
fulfills their expectations as to the effectiveness of the grievance-
arbitration clause in producing "final and binding" decisions.'" These
guides to the future enable the parties not only to plan their actions
in accordance with past interpretations, but also to settle similar griev-
ances without incurring the expense of another arbitration proceed-
131 4VCCO Television provides an example of the detailed analysis required in determining
the identity of the parties. See934 F.2d at 994. There, the union had arbitrated a claim that certain
employees were covered under the pension provision of the parties' labor contract. See id. The
arbitrator concluded that (1) the employees were covered under the contract and so the employer
was liable for pension contributions on their behalf but (2) due to the union delay . in filing the
grievance, the employer need only make these contributions prospectively. Id. at 995. The trustees
of the pension fund then filed a lawsuit for past contributions. See id. The court determined that
(1) the arbitrator's decision denying past contributions did not bind the pension trustees because
they were different parties with different duties than the union but (2) the trustees could use
offensive collateral estoppel for the arbitrator's finding that the employer was liable for contri-
butions for the disputed employees to preclude the employer from relitigating this issue. Id.
Although there was a lack of identity of parties in the two proceedings between the union and
the pension trustees, the same was not true for the employer. See id.
132 See gene.rally AMERICAN ARBITRATORS ASSN & FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV.,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR MANAGEMENT DISPUTES
(1985) [hereinafter GonFd.
I:13 The Code also discusses the use of precedent when the parties have not addressed this in
their agreement: "When the mutual desires of the parties are not known or when the parties
express differing opinions or policies, the arbitrator may exercise discretion as to these matters,
consistent with acceptance of full responsibility for the award." See id. §§ 1.A.1., 6.1., 1.6.1.
1M See, e.g., Gonce v. Veterans Admin., 872 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (arbitrators are
to bring "their best independent judgment to bear, not ritualistically follow what others have
done").
1M See supra note 91.
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nig. Abuse of the arbitral system through harassing claims is also
avoided. This approach engenders a respect for the arbitration mecha-
nism in that judgments will be based upon reason rather than individ-
ual opinion. Congruity and finality instill in all parties—employers,
unions, and employees—a proper regard for the integrity of the proc-
ess. Thus, a second arbitrator who is faced with an issue that has already
been determined in an arbitration case between the parties should give
deference to the decision before overturning it.
This principle of constraint was analyzed by Arbitrator Edgar Jones
in Lucky Stores, Inc., where he followed a prior award regarding bar-
gaining-unit work under an agreement between a multi-employer and
a multi-union unit.'"" Arbitrator Jones concluded that, once the issue
had been decided after a full and fair hearing, the award became "part
of the fabric of the binding consensus of the parties, subject to altera-
tion only as a consequence of their mutual agreement."'" 7
 While the
second arbitrator must bring "the integrity, intelligence and prudence
of each arbitrator that the parties assess and expect will be brought to
bear upon the resolution of the issue," the arbitrator "is not pre-
cluded—but is nonetheless constrained—in the exercise of that juris-
diction."'"" He determined that "[t] he constraint expected of the sec-
ond arbitrator arises out of an exercise of arbitral discretion that is
inferably required by the Agreement; it is not the result of deference
to some judicial mandate."'" In other words, courts reviewing arbitral
decisions rightly reject the incorporation theory because it leads them
too deeply into a consideration of the merits of arbitrators' decisions
under the Entelprise Wheel standard.'" Nevertheless, as a matter of
interpretation, arbitrators normally should apply the incorporation
theory as a principle of constraint that accords with the parties' con-
tractual expectations. If the prior award meets the criteria for res
judicata or collateral estoppel on its face, sound policy dictates that the
later arbitrator should defer, unless the party challenging the award
can demonstrate clear and convincing reasons why these doctrines
should not apply.
136 88-2 Lab. Ai). Awards (CCH) I 8316, at 4582.
"7 /e/. at 4583,
"8 a at 4583-84.
"9 Id. at 4584.
t'10 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
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B. Prior, Inconsistent Awards
When an arbitrator is faced with prior, inconsistent awards, there
are different considerations than when the person is in the role of the
second arbiter considering issues previously arbitrated involving the
parties. If two prior arbitrators have looked at essentially the same
situation between the same or related parties and have come up with
conflicting results, this creates a predicament for the parties. This
situation may not be due to any error by the prior arbitrators. Difficult
issues may reasonably cause arbitrators to view the same issue and
reach different results. The second arbitrator, who disagreed with the
first arbitrator, may not have been convinced by the persuasiveness of
the principle of constraint or may have applied one of the exceptions
to the arbitral res-judicata principles."' Despite the opposite conclu-
sions reached by the arbitrators, reviewing courts are likely to uphold
their decisions.' 42
 Whatever the cause of the contrary decisions, the
parties may look to a third arbitrator to clean up what has become a
mess in their relationship.
For example, suppose that an employer and a union have an
overtime clause which requires: "All work performed on Saturday will
be at overtime rates when the department is in operation." The em-
ployer claims that this means only when the department is in "full"
operation; the union argues that the clause applies when there is "any"
operation in the department on Saturday. Arbitrator A finds for the
union; Arbitrator B determines that A was "clearly wrong" and holds
for the company. If the parties take the issue to a third arbitrator, whose
award should that arbitrator follow—B, who was last; A or B, whoever
the third arbitrator believes reasoned the issue better—or should the
third arbitrator follow different reasoning?' 43
 When faced with diamet-
rically opposed awards, the third arbitrator is in a situation different
from that of a reviewing court which can apply the Enterprise Wheel
standard and hold that both A and B were right, i.e., both decisions
drew their "essence" from the contract. In the situation of a third
arbitration, the parties do not want to know whether the opposite
conclusions of A and B can be considered grounded in the contract.
Rather, they need to know whether employees who work on Saturday
should receive straight-time or overtime rates.
141 For the exceptions to the principles of res jtulicata or collateral estoppel in arbitration,
see supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-74.
143 This hypothetical situation is similar to that faced by Arbitrator Edward Krinsky in Es-
canaba Paper Co., FMCS No. 79K/22108 (Dec. 12, 1979) (unpublished opinion on file with
author), discussed infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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Arbitrator Edward Krinsky, when faced with conflicting awards in
a situation similar to that of the hypothetical overtime grievance, aptly
concluded: "It does not make sense to this arbitrator to reverse [Arbi-
trator B] simply because this arbitrator would not have reversed [Ar-
bitrator A] had he been in [B's] place.""4 In other words, Krinsky
determined on the basis of the principle of constraint that B's deci-
sion—which found that A's opinion was "clearly erroneous"—was in-
correct." 5 He appropriately gave more deference to A's award as a
reasonable interpretation of the contract, which he would have fol-
lowed.'`' [' However, because B had not followed A's decision, Krinsky
had to provide the parties with a resolution."'
When an arbitrator is faced with prior, inconsistent interpreta-
tions, each of which is reasonable, the rationale for the incorpora-
tion theory wanes because the parties have achieved neither consis-
tency nor finality. Certainly the parties do not intend to incorporate
into their collective bargaining agreement clauses which cancel each
other out. By calling in the third arbitrator, they have indicated that
they have been unable to resolve the matter either in negotiations or
through the grievance process. In this situation Krinsky decided that
"it would seem best that this arbitrator do what the parties have asked
him to do in their stipulation of the issue, namely to review the merits
of the issue and make an award." 148 Applying the independent judg-
ment theory is a sensible approach in this circumstance. While the
third arbitrator may be influenced by the soundness of the reasoning
of A or 13, who were faced with the same issue between the same parties,
this effect is more like the persuasiveness of precedent rather than the
principle of constraint. When neither the prior arbitrators nor the
parties themselves can give definitive meaning to their contract, the
arbitrator who hears the dispute a third time should have more room
to create a solution that will be dispositive. Arbitrators who hear a
dispute that is being decided a fourth 119 or fifth time''' should make
an independent decision a fortiori.
Escanaba Paper Co., FMCS No. 79K/22108, at 6-7.
145




149 See Escanaba Paper Co., FMCS No. 79K/22108. at 7. For such a situation, see Independent
Steelworkers' Alliance, 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8273, at 4355 (1988) (Mikrut, Arb.).
Arbitrator Mikrttt was hired with three differing interpretations by prior arbitrators as to the effect
of a waiver of the grievance and arbitration procedure in a last-chance agreement. See id.
See, e.g. Certainteed Corp., Am. Arb. Ass'n Case No. 30-300-00065-92, at 7 (1993)
(Abrams, Arb.) (unpublished opinion on file with author). Arbitrator Abrams Ibund himself
reviewing five prior, inconsistent decisions on the same issue. See id.
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CONCLUSION
Because of the continuing relationship between parties to a col-
lective bargaining agreement, matters previously decided often are
grieved again and come before a labor arbitrator. In such circum-
stances arbitrators must determine the preclusive effect to give to the
decisions of other arbitrators on the same issues involving the same or
related parties. Whether and to what extent labor arbitrators apply
notions of res judicata and collateral estoppel is important for the
development of arbitral jurisprudence and its use by management and
labor. A review of awards indicates that under the principle of con-
straint, most arbitrators viewing the same issue between the same
parties will follow the prior decision unless, in the words of Bernard
Meltzer, it is "preposterously wrong." 151
Even in the situation where the second arbitrator feels compelled
to disagree with the prior arbitrator, this disagreement is often accom-
plished by distinguishing facts or arbitral principles rather than by
saying that the prior decision was "palpably erroneous." In most cir-
cumstances there is no contradiction of opinion but rather a difference
of opinion. Since claims rising through the grievance process to arbi-
tration are often close issues, it is not surprising that arbitrators reach
different, albeit sound, conclusions. This is why courts under Enterprise
Wheel review have no hesitancy in upholding conflicting awards.' 52
Before declaring a prior award as clearly erroneous and not enti-
tled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, Meltzer suggests that
"arbitrators should keep their humility in order."'" Consistency and
finality often are better served by following the principle of constraint
rather than creating a mess of conflicting awards which others must
clean up. However, when the arbitrator is faced with multiple, incon-
sistent opinions, then the arbiter must use independent. judgment to
decide the matter. In such a circumstance, it is a test of the arbitrator's
discretion and creativity to handle the matter in a manner which not
only resolves the problem but also affirms the parties' belief in the
arbitration system.
it liernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideoloz, Law and Arbitration, 20 NATI ACAI,.
AR1SS. 1, 20 (1967).
152 see supra now 42.
153
 Meltzer, supra note 151, at 8.
